Introduction

The world is facing a new debt crisis. Twenty-five of the poorest countries spend more on debt repayments than on education, health and social policy combined. Sixty percent of low- and middle-income developing countries are highly debt vulnerable.

Despite initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 1996, the Debt Service Suspension Initiative in 2020 and others, the origins of this dire situation are both historical and more recent. They include global power dynamics, international and regional barriers to trade and infrastructure development, national political histories and governance decisions around economic development, climatic and other natural disasters. More recently, public debt was exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the climate emergency, and their economic and financial impacts, as well as sometimes dubious national borrowing decisions.

Alongside the rise of new country and institutional lenders over the past 25 years, with different approaches to transparency and terms of lending, there is increasing discussion about the nature and governance of traditional multi-lateral lending institutions and the role of credit agencies. However, decisions on how, when and for what purposes to take on debt lie with national decision-makers and therefore governance of debt decision-making and monitoring of its usage should start at this level.

Breaking out of the current debt crisis and avoiding future ones will therefore require a fundamental shift in oversight and accountability for the way that governments borrow and manage debt. In this context, there is increasing recognition of the unique roles for parliament in the governance of public debt, as identified in the written submission to the UK House of Common’s International Development Committee’s inquiry by Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). And by extension, there will be an increased role for how citizens and civil society engages in public debt debate and scrutiny through their representatives in parliament, with traditional and social media important conduits.

Parliaments, as representatives of people’s interests, as well as lawmakers and agents of accountability, are critical fiscal policy institutions responsible for approving the annual budget and overseeing the government’s execution of its approved programme. Meanwhile, debt managers are responsible for ensuring the government’s financing needs are met at the lowest cost over the medium-to-long term, consistent with an acceptable level of risk, and other objectives such as supporting domestic debt market development.

While parliaments have a responsibility to ensure governments are executing spending decisions that deliver on the needs of citizens, their ability to exercise this responsibility depends largely on the level of transparency on public debt. In practical terms, that means transparency of the Debt Management Strategy (DMS), of the Annual Borrowing Plan, of regular debt reports, of Terms and Conditions of individual loans, and information on contingent liabilities and the management of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In addition, more parliaments attempt to gain a role in the ratification of loans agreements, and exercise oversight of the political choices underpinning the projects which are funded by loans.

From an institutional viewpoint, we notice a trend towards establishing dedicated public debt committees in parliament (for instance in Kenya and Nigeria). In other countries, Committees on Finance, Budget or Public Accounts include public debt in their remit (for instance in Sierra Leone and The Gambia). Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs) embody an opportunity to increased parliamentary capacity for debt oversight (for instance in Kenya and Sierra Leone).

Where parliaments do receive debt related information, it often lacks info on debts and liabilities of sub-national governments and SOEs. This highlights the need for whole-of-government debt information, beyond the debt information on the central government only.

Practice in many countries indicates how the annual budget cycle provides an opportunity for parliament to receive debt information through the different phases of the budget cycle, including at the Pre-Budget Statement, and through mid-year and in-year reports.

By extension, parliaments have a role to open the decision and scrutiny process, engaging with the views of citizens and relevant exerts, while interacting with the media in discussion about the merits and de-merits of debt that will often be borne by future generations, with tax and economic development consequences for the nation and the individual. Such approach to public debt can be transformative in tackling inequality and reviving trust in democratic processes that can respond to the needs/interests of populations.

However, where debt information is made available to parliament, it is sometimes treated for informational purposes, and it is not actively reviewed or scrutinized by parliament. This indicates a significant gap in oversight practices.

Parliamentary oversight of debt management often faces the challenge of executive dominance. In some countries, it means that, for instance, the President might request MPs to adopt proposals, vote for projects, or increase the debt ceiling while the MPs know that this is not a sound policy. In those circumstances, MPs may sometimes feel that they have no choice but to approve requests by the executive, as their position in parliament or within their party – and in extremely worrying cases their personal security and the safety of their family – can depend on it.

This means that debt transparency is not sufficient. There is need for a corruption and patronage lens to fiscal and debt policy. When the national budget is inflated by imprudent projects requiring large loans, it is indebting the country for generations to come. In these circumstances, public debt can be called “budgeted corruption”.
Therefore, in addition to more rigorous oversight by parliaments, civil society also needs a more robust role. CSOs and academics, with expertise in fiscal and debt policies, can play a complementary monitoring role, reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny.

Unsustainable and opaque debt is a democratic deficit. It undermines the social contract which underpins a democratic system of governance. That is why WFD advocates for debt transparency, more rigorous debt accountability to parliament and robust civil society monitoring; in other words: doing debt democratically.

Objectives of the publication

To take stock of the role of parliaments in public debt oversight in Africa, WFD and AFRODAD – the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development - intend on preparing a research publication, which has the following three objectives:

• Analysing the current state of affairs on the role of African parliaments in debt oversight, through a reader with multi-country, comparative and thematic papers.
• Identifying key elements of a reform agenda with regards to African parliaments’ role in public debt oversight, including its interactions with civil society and the media, as it emerges from the review of the papers for the publication.
• Selecting a list of knowledgeable experts on African parliaments’ role in public debt oversight.

The publication will include 8 to 10 peer-reviewed articles, written by different authors. Authors will be invited to submit a full paper based upon a review of the initial paper abstract.

Topics

Authors may consider submitting a paper abstract covering one or more of the following topics, either from the perspective of one African country or from a comparative perspective:

• Analysis of the contribution of parliamentary committees, structures, procedures and resources in public debt oversight, including Parliamentary Budget Offices, and current challenges for parliament’s role in Africa.
• Analysis of parliament’s interaction with governmental institutions managing public debt, and feasibility of an inter-institutional reform agenda for more debt accountability.
• Debt reporting and transparency of public debt management towards parliaments in Africa.
• Analysis of parliament’s role in ratification of loan agreements, and in scrutiny of key policy documents such as the Debt Management Strategy and Annual Borrowing Plan in Africa.
• Stakeholder engagement and interaction with civil society and the public in public debt management in Africa.
• The interaction of gender, parliamentary scrutiny and debt decision making in Africa.
• The relationship between fiscal policy and debt management in contexts of crisis, conflict, war and the pandemic and the roles played by African parliaments.
• Outcomes, constraints and examples in parliament’s role in debt oversight during the different phases of the budget cycle.
• The impact of traditional and social media in public debt information, scrutiny and linkages with parliamentary oversight.
• Ingredients for successful reform of public debt oversight, learning from successes and failures of transparency, scrutiny, and multi-stakeholder involvement.
• What factors have contributed to successful reforms? Including the role of international standards and reporting, and the influence and lending by International Financial Institutions, and their interface with parliaments.
• What reforms are feasible (or what approach is recommended) in countries where authoritarianism or limited political plurality is a constraint? What have been the outcomes of external support for reforms in these contexts?

We expect proposals to be based upon ‘thinking and working politically’ principles. This means, for instance, rather than listing all the institutions a country should create, we would expect an analysis of why the existing ones aren’t working and how any new ones would mitigate or overcome those risks. Articles thus highlight that debt oversight is political and touches on incentives around sovereignty, corruption, and balance of powers among institutions.

Paper abstracts and full papers

• WFD and AFRODAD are inviting interested authors to submit a paper abstract of max 500 words. 
• The abstract should specify and motivate the specific research question related to one or more topics mentioned above, describe the methods and data used, and give an indication of the findings. Proposals are welcome from diverse methodological approaches, countries, regions, and cases. 
• Paper abstracts should ideally specify (i) the importance of the core topic and questions to be addressed, (ii) the theory and propositions to be investigated, (iii) the evidence and example(s) from parliament(s) researched, (iv) brief citations to the key literatures. 
• Submission of the abstract should be accompanied by a cover letter describing the author’s research interests, a CV and list of publications. 
• The editorial board will review the paper abstracts and decide on which abstracts to accept. 
• Authors of accepted proposals will be expected to submit a full paper of 3,000 to 4,000 words (excluding bibliography), in line with editorial guidance.
• Authors of full papers will be invited to present their research findings at an expert seminar. 
• Comments received through the peer-review process and comments from the expert seminar are expected to be addressed in the final paper.
• Paper abstracts, full papers, cover letters and CVs can be submitted to WFD via Franklin.DeVrieze@wfd.org, with subject line: Call for Papers – public debt.

Profile of the authors invited to submit a paper abstract

• Academics, researchers, and think-tanks, from Africa and beyond.
• Parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, staff of Parliamentary Budget Offices from Africa.
• Staff from Supreme Audit Institutions and Debt Management Offices. 
• Governance experts and civil society knowledgeable on public financial management and public debt management. 
• Staff of international organisations, WFD, AFRODAD and parliamentary development practitioners.

Proposals by individual authors as well as by a team of two or three authors are welcome.

Authors will be rewarded through their inclusion in a copyrighted publication, in a global social media campaign for the publication, and through WFD and AFRODAD networking with other organizations such as the African Conference on Debt and Development (AfCoDD). In addition to a financial remuneration of 450 GBP per finalized paper, authors will be offered inclusion in a preferential list of experts to be contracted for technical assistance to new WFD programming on public debt oversight.

Expert-seminar

• The expert seminar will provide an opportunity for authors to present their draft paper and receive feedback from peer-reviewers and other seminar participants.
• Invitees for the expert seminar will include the authors of papers, peer-reviewers per paper, representatives of parliaments analysed in the papers, WFD staff, and public debt experts.
• Registered seminar participants will receive a copy of all draft papers prior to the seminar.
• The expert seminar will take place in hybrid format, at WFD offices in London and online.

Timeline

Contact

• Franklin De Vrieze, Head of Practice Accountability, WFD. Email: Franklin.Devrieze@wfd.org 
• Shem Joshua Otieno, Policy Analyst and Advocacy Officer- Sovereign Debt Management, AFRODAD. Email: shem@afrodad.org